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Arms and the Man: how the Scots who bled with Wallace 
fought in Braveheart and in History 
Scotland's war of independence was, like most wars, decided militarily 
i.e. by the military success of Scots armies. The ability to raise armies to 
drive out the English was therefore crucial. In feudal times in most of Europe 
armies were normally raised and centred on the feudal landholding nobility. 
In Scotland in the abnormal period of Wallace's career many or most of the 
nobility were not strongly, if at all, committed to the cause that Wallace 
championed. This fact greatly affected the composition and armament of the 
Scots forces in Wallace's battles. In consequence two things were necessary-
popular support and making do without the normal contingent of mounted 
nobles, often the most important and sometimes even the largest part of a 
medieval army. 
In all ages before modem times, the only two basic types of soldier 
were the mounted (in medieval times nobles and their personal followers) and 
those on foot; and virtually the only subdivisions were between heavy-armed 
men and light-armed. Because so few Scots nobles took Wallace's side, his 
armies were basically of infantry. By contrast, Edward I's armies in Scotland 
always had a strong cavalry element. The whole Scots nobility mounted and 
armoured for battle would have been relatively few against even that part of 
the English chivalry that Edward I could spare from his affairs in France. 
The infantry in medieval Western Europe was divided into two types -
those who could fight only at close quarters and hand-to-hand and those who 
could shoot (or hurl) missiles at opponents, at least for part of the conflict, for 
distances up to 200 or 300 paces. The Scots, for no doubt sufficient social, 
economic, cultural or traditional reasons, had relatively few missile-men and 
those armed with the relatively short Scots bow. Crossbowmen apparently 
were not present in significant numbers. 
Neither the few Scots mounted men nor the more numerous English 
cavalry included any missile-men. However, Edward I's foot troops included 
relatively large numbers of very skilled archers armed with longbows. These 
may have been already on the way to becoming professionals. Some historians 
assume or assert that all these bowmen serving the King of England were 
Welsh, and certainly the six-foot bow, so long associated with England, 
originated in Wales. But by the early fourteenth century and the beginning of 
the Hundred Years War in the Crecy campaign many, if not most of the 
'English' archers were in fact Englishmen, and men of a group rising in 
status, freemen in a society full of villeins and serfs, with self-respect and a 
degree of independence. 
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The opposing armies in Wallace's first pitched battle - Stirling Bridge 
differed greatly and the same difference was more or less seen in the 
second and last of his great battles, Falkirk. On the Scots side was an army of 
essentially infantry overwhelmingly non-archer, and thus able to fight (only) 
hand-to-hand and on the English side cavalry and two kinds of infantry - the 
archers and the rest. Since there were no obvious differences in training, 
discipline and experience in the Scots infantry (e.g. no regulars or 
professionals as against raw recruits and untrained levies; no fully-armoured 
heavy foot as against light-tmoving Highlanders) it is impossible to say that 
any one section of the Scots army was more important or more useful 
inherently than any other part - all were equally useful or useless depending 
on the circumstances and how they were led or commanded. 
In the English armies, the three major divisions - mounted, archers 
and the rest - were of very different value and use. The cavalry were 
basically heavy-armoured men-at-arms or knights, on chargers bred for war. 
The men also were in theory, and often in practice, bred for war. They relied 
on shock tactics, charging home at best speed with levelled spears ('couched' 
lances) and, theoretically, were virtually irresistible by any targeted enemies 
in an open field. (When two such charges met one another, according to some 
old chronicles, men's thighs and horses' necks and backs could be broken in 
the shock.) Knightly heavy cavalry traditionally from the time the Middle 
Ages emerged from the Dark Ages had ruled the battlefields of Europe. In 
the earlier centuries, the spear was a stabbing weapon held often above the 
rider's head, but by about 1100 AD the couched lance, with its butt tucked 
under the rider's right (spear) arm, his shield hung round his neck and his left 
hand free for the reins, produced a united force of man, horse and spear in a 
single unswerving guided missile powered by the momentum of the horse's 
weight and speed. 
This development not only greatly enhanced the power of the knight's 
charge but also somewhat limited the adaptability and versatility of the 
knight's activity, at least in the first onset. A contemporary described the 
charge of a knight as follows: 'It is indispensible for anyone who wants to give 
a blow with a lance to press his hand and his forearm against his side on his 
lance, and let his horse guide itself as best it can at the moment of impact. For 
if a man moves his hand, or attempts to guide his lance, the blow does no 
damage.' I Those who have watched tent-pegging contests will appreciate the 
skilled aim that a lancer can develop at full gallop. 
Naturally after the first charge, knights could and did combat with 
weapons other than spears, especially swords, axes and maces. But the 
greatest reliance was placed on jousting as training for the charge with the 
levelled lance. Within limits, these knightly men-at-arms had discipline and 
1 Usamah, a Saracen historian. 
even used simple formations, especially that called en haie, i.e a long single or 
double rank for the charge. Their courage was formidable. Based on pride 
and noblesse oblige, it consisted of an overwhelming fear of showing fear, and 
thus betraying their class, belying their birth and forfeiting, morally if not 
legally, their rights and privileges. 
Heavy cavalry were of limited use for the guerilla warfare mostly 
practised by Wallace's men and in all very mountainous, heavily-wooded or 
boggy terrain. They were also less useful in attacking or even defending 
castles and other fortifications, for which purpose they would have to 
dismount, than were the next great division of English soldiery, the 
longbowmen. These were fully adapted to broken or difficult terrain and to 
skirmishing and especially to sieges and, as well, were often decisive in a 
pitched battle where, however, they needed adequate protection from sudden 
attack by close combat troops. The longbowmen early gained and long 
preserved a reputation for deadly shooting, courage and discipline. 
The remaining English infantry would be armed, no doubt, with various 
types of polearms - spears of various lengths, axes, the occasional grisly 
'holy water sprinkler' with its numerous steel points and protrusions, and the 
bill, the weapon which became by the 1400s so characteristic of non-archer 
English infantry that the phrase 'Bows and bills'! was a frequent battle shout. 
The bill was the English version of the halberd (halbert) - that eight-foot 
polearm so popular with and deadly in the hands of Swiss mountaineers.2 The 
later (and shorter) English poleaxe, which had spike and hook, was less an 
infantry arm than a weapon for knights fighting on foot. In any case, 
thirteenth to fourteenth century non-archer English infantry, however they 
were armed, have left no mark on history. They gained no great reputation 
for discipline or for valiant or lethal or decisive deeds on the battlefield. 
They were, no doubt useful to help hold or besiege fortifications and on a 
stricken field, perhaps to guard archers or to scuffle with similarly armed 
opponents. But unlike archers and knights they played no leading roles and 
decided no decisive battles. 
Many or most of the Scots infantry may have been similarly and as 
variously armed as that third estate of the English army. Some few may have 
wielded the original claymore (great sword), the two-handed weapon which 
Wallace and such giants could no doubt handle with ease. But most Scottish 
swordsmen probably had shields or targes, and swords of any kind (being 
fairly expensive) were probably relatively few compared with spears, axes and 
other weapons, many converted from agricultural implements. Certainly the 
Scots infantry needed no better equipment than that of Wallace's men in the 
2 The bill had a slightly concave axe-like blade, curved forward, slightly hook-like, unlike the 
halberd's straight or slightly convex blade. The bill before the 15th century was not furnished 




Braveheart film, if they could charge home on the English infantry. And, in 
historical fact, a (no doubt furious) charge of the Scots did play the major, 
almost the only, Scots part in their victory in the historical battle of Stirling 
Bridge.3 
Whoever planned the Scots response to the English advance, it was a 
classic ploy to nullify the advantage one side had in numbers and equipment. 
The trick was seen often, both long before and long after Wallace's lifetime 
whenever a smaller army attacked by surprise a larger army. It consisted in 
ensuring that half of the larger army could not easily, or even at all, get into 
action to help those of their comrades suddenly in danger. In the case of 
Stirling Bridge, the river was deep and fast and the bridge narrow. The Scots, 
by their sudden onslaught after only half the English had crossed seized 
control of the north end of the bridge, simultaneously preventing more 
English from crossing to aid their hard-pressed comrades already on the north 
bank, and preventing those (or most of them) who had crossed from retreating 
or fleeing to safety. The English were in the strategic sense the agressors, 
advancing on the Scots who were behind the river, but not too close to it. 
However, the Scots were tactically attacking, initiating the combat with utmost 
speed to effectively come to close quarters before either a cavalry charge 
could be launched against them or a barrage of archery used to decimate and 
perhaps demoralise them. 
Instead, the first half of the English army which crossed the bridge was 
disordered and probably demoralised, trapped north of the bridge, in sight of 
their comrades on the south bank. They were apparently penned in an 
increasingly crowded space in a bend of the river and there destroyed without 
the possibility of help and with little hope of flight. The remainder of the 
English, were not only materially weakened by the destruction north of the 
bridge, but also must have been quite discouraged by the sight of that 
slaughter. The battle of Stirling Bridge provides no clue to the value of 
English archery. The bowmen, whether north or south of the river, would 
not have been able to affect the result of the battle, any who had crossed the 
bridge would have been almost at once fighting hand-to-hand against, or 
recoiling from Scots as well armed as themselves or more so for close 
quarters combat. Those on the south bank could have shot only their own 
comrades who were between themselves and the attacking Scots. 
Nor was the course of the battle any reflection on the worth as fighting 
men or the effectiveness in open battle of heavy-armed medieval cavalry, the 
armed knightly men-at-arms. Their favourite and most effective weapon, the 
lance, an increasingly lengthy spear, was only effective when couched and 
borne at speed against the opponent. Stationary horsemen were at no great 
3 For infantry weapons, and the rank of those possessing swords and spears, see E. Tunis, 
Weapons (London, 1954), pp. 71-2 and 84-5; and P. Contamine, War in the Middle Ages 
(Oxford, 1986), p. 179 and passim. 
advantage, if any, against attacking infantry. Probably the advantage of 
morale was with the excited and soon exultant Scots, far more numerous than 
the English cavalry (even if outnumbered by the English foot, which in this 
instance would be almost irrelevant). At best, if the knights dropped their 
spears and lashed out with sword or mace they might be at even odds with 
their attackers who would, however, be also attacking the unarmoured and 
thus vulnerable horses. And whenever a horse fell - well, as Spaniards put 
it, 'Muerto el caballo, perdido el caballero.' - 'Dead the horse, lost the 
horseman'. 
Did the Scots at Stirling Bridge use spears? Almost certainly. In the 
first place, spears had been either chosen weapons or the arm jaute de mieux 
of most infantry in most ages before the age of firearms. Homeric heroes 
threw their spears and/or thrust and stabbed with them. Even the great 
exceptions, the Roman legionaries who conquered the Mediterranean world 
basically with short swords, reverted to spear-carrying long before the decline 
and fall in the west. And it is hard to imagine how they could have coped with 
a stirrups-using lance-carrying medieval heavy cavalry when the unstirruped 
heavy cavalry plus archery of the Parthians stopped the Romans at the height 
of their military prowess. Throughout the Dark Ages and in the rise and 
heyday of the feudal Middle Ages, the commonest infantry figure was a 
spearman. When infantry of the communal militias of Belgium and northern 
Italy began to do more than defend their walls, and fought in the open, they 
used long spears (pikes) and with these they could, sometimes, defeat the 
feudal chivalry in pitched battles. The great users and popularisers of the 
halberd, the Swiss, also adopted the pike, and their terrifyingly mobile and 
ruthless squares of halberdeers which, for centuries, so rapidly attacked and 
often routed armies in northern Italy and eastern France came to have skirts 
or edges of pikemen holding sixteen- to eighteen-foot spears and able to beat 
off or drive back the mounted men at arms and drive back or rout or destroy 
most opposing infantry. There is no reason to doubt that Scots could have 
done the same if they had acquired the skill and experience which the Swiss 
acquired from practice and frequent service abroad as mercenaries. But the 
histories of Flodden and Pinkie show dogged courage more than the 
consummate competence and elan of the Swiss in their prime.4 
Putting aside recollections of what the Swiss did and speculations on 
what Scots might have done or become able to do, let us consider what the 
film Braveheart showed of the Scots and of William Wallace in their military 
activities. In the minor actions before Stirling Bridge, Wallace is shown as the 
resourceful and successful guerilla leader, which he undoubtedly was. No 
doubt the conventions of Hollywood film-making dictated that as 'baddies' 
4 For comparisons between Scots and Swiss peasantry and their aptness for war, see, 
Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, p. 73 and passim. For two ways of using spears on foot, 
Tunis, Weapons, pp. 25-26. 
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English soldiers who in fact wore no kind of uniform, let alone those shown, 
had to act invariably stupid, clumsy and slow to be invariably overcome, even 
by attackers in the senior citizen age-group. The sentries of 'baddies' do not 
see, their archers never think (in time) of loosing their arrows. 
Wallace is shown as a doughty swordsman, which the historical leader 
undoubtedly was, but it is unfortunate that, instead of a Schwarzenegger in 
built-up shoes, a relatively short actor had to play the role of a warrior of 
whom one of the few certainties is that he was of gigantic size and strength. 
Mel Gibson tries to disarm criticism by asserting that any claims of the 
greatness of Wallace's person must be an accretion of fictional legend, 
attracted to a successful fighting man. 
For the appearance of the Scots of Braveheart, little needs to be said, 
except that they are all shown wearing kilts, whereas in fact none would have; 
there is no suggestion that any Highlanders were involved in either of 
Wallace's major campaigns and his whole military career was in the 
Lowlands. Even nobles on horseback insist on wearing kilts, but in 
compensation most Scots wear no headgear. Presumably it never rains in 
Scotland. Even nobles fighting in a pitched battle, where in fact they would 
have been in full armour, have no protection for their head, the most 
vulnerable part of the human body, and the one which was the last to be 
guarded with a helmet when soldiers' armour went out of fashion, and the 
first part to be re-armoured in World War I. 
The Scots army at Stirling Bridge was not (as in the film) one raised by 
vacillating nobles and hi-jacked by Wallace, who inexplicably becomes able to 
command it. It was a combination of two insurgent forces which had come 
together in central Scotland from opposite directions after parallel careers of 
successfully overcoming English occupation forces and garrisons. The more 
southern force was led by Wallace, the northern by Sir Andrew Moray or 
Murray, a personage obviously of great historical importance in Wallace's 
career, but unmentioned in Braveheart. How the armies were raised or 
gathered is not clear either in the film or in history. No doubt a lot of 
volunteering occurred as indignant and xenophobic Scots, resenting the 
insolence of the English who acted as masters after Edward I's brutal 
extension of his power, joined those daring souls who gave a lead to 
resistance. Almost certainly neither of the two leaders would have been above 
pressuring men to join them, and quite possibly there was a degree of covert 
support for their recruiting by one or more of the great nobles, most likely 
including the Steward of Scotland, whose descendants within a century 
succeeded the Bruces as the royal house of Scotland. 
Braveheart gives no suggestion of the truth of the provenance of the 
Scots army at Stirling Bridge. According to its own story, Wallace was 
unknown except from hearsay to most of the men in that army until a few 
minutes before the fighting. Yet Wallace is able to command the loyalty and 
obedience of the men and is able to get them to perform some novel drills 
with long spears, which are miscalled shiltrons.S The shiltron was actually a 
formation, the dense hedgehog of spearmen, secure from close combat attack 
so long as the men kept their nerve. 
At the beginning of Wallace's first pitched battle in Braveheart the 
English commander gives the sensible order for his archers to begin the action 
with a relatively long-range arrow bombardment of the ranks of the Scots, no 
doubt expecting this to reduce both their numbers and their courage before 
any attack with hand-held weapons. This was a normal procedure for not just 
an English, but any medieval army from 1066 at Hastings, if not earlier. 
Even the usually overconfident French at least set out to do the same at Crecy. 
In the next campaign after Stirling Bridge, Edward I used these very tactics to 
gain his victory at Falkirk and had they been used at Stirling Bridge they 
would have been very likely to have produced a victory there. Braveheart 
shows the English archers at Stirling Bridge shooting volleys to order on 
several occasions. It is true that bowmen would usually be restrained by their 
discipline from shooting until the command or permission to loose was given, 
which would be only when the archers were at what the commander thought 
was the right distance from the enemy, and would then all begin shooting 
together. But what Braveheart showed was a parody of an archery barrage 
which, in fact, would be fairly continuous until most of the arrows available, 
about forty to each bowman, had been shot. Nor would there be longish 
pauses between single flights of arrows, in perhaps a sporting spirit in order 
to give the Scots time to recover their spirits and dress their ranks in time for 
the next hail of missiles, or, in the film, to bare their arses in vulgar mockery 
of their enemies. Instead, an unceasing and lethal hail of arrows would 
torment the stationary army (unless it had its own counterforce of archers) 
until perhaps 100,000 to 200,000 shot had fallen in the space occupied by the 
archers' targets. And this was not a random storm of lead bullets fired merely 
in the general direction of the enemy, such as graced (or disgraced) 
battlefields from the late 1600s to recent years when, according to optimists, it 
took 100 bullets to kill one man while realists put the number at 1000 and 
pessimists at 10,000. Longbowmen were marksmen, shooting in their own 
time and under no pressure to outdo the enemy in volume of fire; undeafened 
by the noise of thousands of firings and with their eyes not impeded by clouds 
of smoke. Their weapons were weapons of precision which could produce 
great accuracy in the hands of practised men. It took years of practice to 
make such an archer and all the practice consisted of firing at targets. The 
musketeers in following centuries were not practised in target firing and could 
5 It is also spelled schil tron. 
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always blame the poor quality of their weapons for misses, even if they did 
attempt to aim. 6 
It is perfectly ridiculous for Braveheart to suggest that the Scots 
received the lethal archery by baring their buttocks, both because they would 
be wearing the normal hose or trews of Lowland peasants and also because 
they would be very concerned to avoid making themselves more vulnerable 
targets in the unceasing rain of arrows. There is, of course, no suggestion in 
any records to give grounds for Mel Gibson's assertion that the Scots 
habitually 'mooned' their opponents. On the contrary, many accounts of 
battles including Falkirk, refer to the misery produced by the arrow storm, 
especially if it could not be answered in kind. The desperation it produced 
often led to a trickle of fugitives and deserters from the rear and occasionally 
a furious attack on the tormenters, which would break the ranks of the 
defenders and lead to their defeat at the hands of watchful cavalry. 
Just as there was no barrage of archery at the real Stirling Bridge, nor 
was there a massed cavalry charge. Braveheart does show what could happen 
in the way of a bloody check to a cavalry charge if a steady infantry, with 
long spears whose butts were firmly planted on the ground received the 
horsemen with courage and cohesion. All cavalry commanders, however, 
were fully aware of the danger of charging steady and well-formed spearmen 
before an arrow storm had done its work of disintegrating the shiltrons as it 
did at Falkirk. What is incredible is the manoeuvre shown in Braveheart of 
the infantry at Stirling Bridge tricking or ambushing a cavalry charge by 
picking up at the last moment the long, sharpened poles which acted as pikes 
and suddenly presenting a well-ordered hedgehog formation. Probably no 
such trick was ever attempted, even by well-trained and veteran professionals, 
let alone the peasant levies of an insurgent people's army. Any spears held by 
the Scots infantry at Stirling Bridge or Falkirk or anywhere else, would be 
their principal or only weapons throughout any battle they fought and 
probably separated from them only in death or flight. The other tricks in 
Brave heart are equally baseless. The idea of fire arrows setting the battlefield 
alight is perhaps pleasing, but it never happened at Falkirk or anywhere else. 
What is not clear, either from Braveheart or from historical records 
that I have seen, is how long the spears were that the Scots infantry used. 
Since very long spears would not be easily carried, at speed anyway, or easily 
used in attack except by trained soldiers, it seems most likely that at Stirling 
Bridge Wallace's and Moray's men carried only relatively short spears plus 
axes etc. At Falkirk, where Wallace stood on the defensive, his shiltrons may 
6 For accuracy of the English archer hitting a man-size target 12 out of 12 at 240 yards see, 
Tunis, Weapons, pp. 61-62; also seeK. Toman, Military Uniforms and Weapons (London, 
1964), pp. 51, 57 and 59. For contrasting lack of accuracy of firearms, see Tunis, Weapons, 
and B. Nasworthy, Battle Tactics of Napoleon and his Enemies (Bury St. Edmunds, 1997) p. 
188 et seq. 
have had longer weapons, but probably not of the length of pikes, which 
themselves had not yet reached their sixteenth and seventeenth century 
maximum of eighteen feet. It may be that the Scots infantry spears were ca. 
1300 and remained for centuries shorter than those of continental armies: 
there is a claim that the French government sent to James IV in time for 
Flodden a considerable quantity of pikes, which in the fatal battle, the English 
countered not only by archery but also by using bills to chop the long pike 
handles. The importance of the difference between shorter spears (up to eight 
or nine feet) and longer spears (up to eighteen feet) was that the shorter could 
be used with one hand by a man who also held a shield; the longer needed two 
hands and the spearman could not manage a shield. 
If the Scots spears at Falkirk were in fact longer than those they carried 
at Stirling Bridge, it could have been a defensive move, perhaps because of 
Edward I's own reputation as one of the most successful war leaders of his 
time or because of the size and quality of Edward's army or even possibly 
because of the loss of Andrew Moray, Wallace's co-general at Stirling Bridge, 
well before the battle of Falkirk. It is also just possible that Wallace and his 
men may have become aware of the need for serious defence against heavy 
English cavalry as a result of that minor episode of the real battle of Stirling 
Bridge, in which an English knight extricated his own mounted following 
from the disaster by cutting his way to the bridge and recrossing it. This was 
a notable example of what could be done by even a small force of men-at-arms 
which kept its courage and cohesion and was well led by an undismayed 
commander.? 
Braveheart conveys the essence of what was at stake in the Scots war of 
independence, but unfortunately contrives to be wrong on almost all the facts 
about most of the prominent persons involved. It gives a reasonable 
impression of how a largely infantry melee could have appeared, such as did 
occur at the real Stirling Bridge, and again of how a cavalry charge could 
have looked before and after its failure: but such a charge was not made at 
Stirling Bridge and at Falkirk the cavalry did not fail. Most of the rest of the 
scenes of fighting throw little light on the weapons used and the manner in 
which they were used. Unfortunately, a great deal of unhistorical 
disinformation is given, as Hollywood 'effects' are produced to thrill and 
entertain. 
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7 For Edward l's major contributions to 'progress' in war (a professional army, and the greater 
exploitation of the long bow) see Feild Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, A History 
oJWarefare (London, 1968), pp. 196-98. 
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